The Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration to the United States

The Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration to the United States

COVID-19 Immigration

The Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration to the United States

Alexander Arnon · · 20 min read
The Impact of COVID-19 on Immigration to the United States

The COVID-19 pandemic caused major disruptions to U.S. immigration. Policymakers imposed travel restrictions, stopped visa processing, and made significant changes at the border. The pandemic and policy response led to more employment-based immigration and increased illegal border crossings instead of reducing them.


Key Points

  • During the pandemic, the number of new immigrants arriving on family-sponsored green cards dropped significantly. The unused visas were given to employment-sponsored immigrants, allowing over 200,000 employed noncitizens already in the U.S. to get lawful permanent resident status, plus tens of thousands of new arrivals on employment-sponsored green cards.

  • In 2021, about half as many nonimmigrants were admitted to live in the U.S. temporarily compared to 2019, but the number more than recovered by 2023. The number of nonimmigrants entering on F1 student visas is still about 3% lower than before the pandemic, but H-1B worker temporary admissions rose to 440,000 in 2023, which is more than a third above the pre-pandemic level.

  • The use of public health emergency authorities under Title 42 aimed to seal the border by expelling migrants immediately but had the opposite effect. Without a way to seek humanitarian protection and facing no legal consequences for trying to cross the border illegally, migrants made repeated attempts to cross, and more succeeded. PWBM estimates that during the Title 42 era, the number of entries without inspection rose from 10,000-15,000 per month to a peak of over 85,000.

Background

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 disrupted nearly every aspect of the U.S. immigration system. Beginning with restrictions on travel from China in January, by March the policy response included suspension of visa services at all embassies and consulates, partial closure of the U.S. land border, suspension of refugee resettlement, and widening restrictions on travel. Some of the measures enacted in 2020 remained in effect for years and have had lasting impact beyond the direct effects of the pandemic.1

In this brief, we review trends in immigration to the U.S. since 2020 and discuss the pandemic’s long-term impact on the foreign-born population.

Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs)

In April 2020, the Trump administration issued a presidential proclamation suspending the entry of most LPRs (also called green card holders or, formally, immigrants), which remained in effect until February 2021. Figure 1 shows the number of new LPRs by fiscal year, broken down into two categories: new immigrants arriving from abroad to live in the U.S. and noncitizens already in the U.S. (on a nonimmigrant visa, for instance) who are adjusting to LPR status. The number of new arrivals fell more than 40 percent in fiscal year 2020 and declined again in 2021, falling to less than 230,000 or just 50 percent of its 2019 level.2 It recovered to around 560,000 in 2023, the most since 2017. However, there are statutory ceilings on the number of green cards issued each year. These caps make “catch up” new arrivals unlikely, meaning the cumulative inflow of new immigrants is permanently lower than it would have been absent the pandemic.

Figure 1. New LPRs by Type of Admission

Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Note: Years are fiscal years.

The number of noncitizens adjusting to LPR status remained comparatively stable through pandemic, falling less than 25 percent in 2020 and recovering to 90 percent of its 2019 level in 2021. In 2023, 615,000 noncitizens in the U.S. became LPRs, the most in any fiscal year since 2009.

One key reason adjustments of status held up through the pandemic is that unused visas for new arrivals could be reallocated to adjustments of status. Figure 2 shows that the number of new arrivals with family-sponsored green cards fell sharply in 2020 and 2021. When the number of family-based green cards issued in a year is less than annual statutory limit, they are added to the limit on employment-based visas the following year in a process referred to as rollover.

Figure 2. New LPRs by Type and Selected Class of Admission, with Pre-Pandemic Trends

Figure 2

Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Note: The dashed line shows the linear trend from 2014 to 2019, extrapolated through 2023.
Years are fiscal years.

Figure 2 plots pre-pandemic trends as simple proxy for typical green card issuance, given statutory numerical limits. In 2021, the number of family-based new arrivals was about 150,000 below trend. An increase in family-based new arrivals absorbed around 9,000 of these green cards, leaving more than 140,000 unused. In 2022, employment-based new arrivals rose by 16,000 and adjustment of status rose by 125,000, totaling 141,000 additional employment-based LPRs. New employment-sponsored LPRs remained elevated in 2023, reflecting the continuing shortfall in family-based arrivals in 2022. Hence, one consequence of the pandemic was a temporary shift in the balance of permanent immigration away from family preferences and toward employment preferences.

Resident Nonimmigrants

Two months after suspending entry of immigrants, in June 2020 the Trump administration issued another presidential proclamation suspending entry of many temporary nonimmigrant workers. The proclamation paused the issuance of most new H-1B, H-2B, J, and L visas until it expired at the end of March 2021. More significantly, COVID-19 severely disrupted routine operations at U.S. embassies and consulates and travel to and from the U.S.3

Figure 3 plots the number of resident nonimmigrants admitted to the U.S. year, which includes nonimmigrants who reside in the U.S. temporarily for purposes like employment or education and excludes non-resident visitors such as tourists. The number of nonimmigrants entering the U.S. fell more than 50 percent from 2019 to 2021. Since 2021 it has bounced back and in 2023 rose to nearly 4.2 million, more than 10 percent greater than the pre-pandemic peak of around 3.75 million in 2019. This rebound likely reflects pent-up arrivals from the pandemic years.

Figure 3. Resident Nonimmigrant Individuals Admitted

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates based on data from the Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Notes: The number of nonimmigrant individuals admitted each year is estimated based on annual nonimmigrant admissions and the number of times each nonimmigrant is admitted per year.
Resident nonimmigrants are temporary workers, students, exchange visitors, diplomats and other representatives, and their families. It does not include temporary visitors for business or pleasure or other classes of nonimmigrants who do not remain the U.S. long enough to be considered residents.
Years are fiscal years.

The decline and recovery in resident nonimmigrant admissions has not been even across different categories of nonimmigrant. Figure 4 compares the number of nonimmigrants admitted on a student F1 visas (left panel) with the number admitted on specialty occupation H-1B visas (right panel). International student admissions dropped nearly 50% from 2019 to 2021, while the number of H-1B workers admitted plummeted almost 70 percent to fewer than 100,000. By 2023 however, H-1B admissions rose to 440,000, more than a third above the pre-pandemic level. Meanwhile, student admissions have yet to fully recover and remain about 3 percent lower than in 2019.

Figure 4. Resident Nonimmigrant Individuals Admitted by Selected Class of Admission

Figure 4

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates based on data from the Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Notes: The number of nonimmigrant individuals admitted each year is estimated based on annual nonimmigrant admissions and the number of times each nonimmigrant is admitted per year.
The figures above include principal beneficiaries of F1 and H-1B visas only; spouses and children are not included.
Years are fiscal years.

Refugees

The number of refugees admitted reached historic lows even before the pandemic, as the Trump administration repeatedly lowered the annual ceiling of refugee resettlements while admitting too few to reach even the reduced cap. Refugee resettlement was suspended altogether when the pandemic arrived in the U.S. in March 2020 and remained paused through July. Resettlement was effectively impossible for much of 2020, as international travel and coordination were severely disrupted.

Figure 5. Annual Refugee Arrivals and Refugee Admissions Ceiling

Sources: Office of Homeland Security Statistics (arrivals in 2014 to 2023); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (arrivals in 2024); Congressional Research Service (admissions ceiling in 2014 to 2022); Presidential determinations/White House (admissions ceiling in 2023 and 2024).
Notes: The shaded area between the two lines indicates the volume of unused refugee resettlement placements each year.
Years are fiscal years.

Since taking office, the Biden administration has rapidly increased the annual ceiling, raising it to 125,000 in 2022, where it has remained since. However, the actual number of refugees resettled has fallen far short of these caps. Figure 2 plots the annual ceiling and the number of refugees admitted. In 2022, only about 26,000 refugees came to the U.S., a little over 20 percent of the 125,000 ceiling. That percentage rose to almost 50 percent in 2023 and 80 percent in 2024, with the U.S. resettling more than 100,000 refugees. The Biden administration attributes the low levels of admissions in recent years primarily to reductions in funding and staff under the Trump administration, but also cites the pandemic as a factor hampering their attempts to rebuild the resettlement program and reach the annual caps.

Border Crossings

Over the last several years, the number of migrants attempting to cross a U.S. border without prior authorization to enter the country has surged. Figure 1 shows PWBM’s estimate of the number of times a migrant attempted to cross a U.S. without a visa or other travel documents each month, based on data methods from U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security. The surge began in 2019, with a 65 percent increase in border crossing attempts compared with 2018. The outbreak of COVID-19 interrupted the surge but does not appear to have meaningfully altered its trajectory. This dramatic rise in crossing attempts – from around 50,000 per month before 2020 to more than 300,000 in 2023 – can largely be traced to an evolving set of idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the pandemic driving migration flows: interstate and internal armed conflict, state failure and gang violence, as well as strong economic conditions in the U.S. relative to other countries.

Figure 6. Number of Attempted Border Crossings Without Prior Authorization

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates based on data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and David Bier/Cato Institute.
Notes: USBP = United States Border Patrol; OFO = Office of Field Operations.
Estimates are nationwide and include air, land, and sea borders.
Encounters with OFO at ports of entry (PoE) are described by CBP as “inadmissibles” and encounters with USBP between PoEs are described as “apprehensions” or “arrests.” Attempting to cross at PoE without prior authorization to enter the U.S. is legal. Attempting to cross the border between PoEs is illegal even with authorization to enter through a PoE.
Entries without inspection (EWIs) are individuals who successfully attempt to cross the border between PoEs without being encountered by USBP. EWIs include border crossers directly or indirectly observed (but not intercepted) by USBP plus an estimate of the number of undetected border crossers. Undetected EWIs are estimated based on DHS modeling, adapted by Penn Wharton Budget Model.

However, one aspect of the immigration policy response to the pandemic has had a significant impact on how the surge has played out: in March 2020, the Trump administration began exercising public health emergency authorities under Title 42 of the U.S. Code, enabling them to prohibit the entry of individuals who pose a danger to public health into the U.S. Under Title 42 authorities, CBP is able “expel” migrants at the border who lack authorization to the enter the U.S. without placing them into removal proceedings – the conventional process by which U.S. authorities deport migrants to their home or a third country. Title 42 remained in effect until May 2023.

Unlike conventional removal proceedings, expulsion under Title 42 generally does not grant migrants the opportunity to enter an asylum claim and seek relief from deportation. However, also unlike removal, expulsion has no criminal or civil ramifications, such as being barred from any form of admission to the U.S. for a period of time. Expelled border crossers may attempt another crossing without fear of compounding legal consequences.

Figure 7. Entries Without Inspection and the Title 42 Era

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates based on data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and David Bier/Cato Institute.
Note: Entries without inspection (EWIs) are individuals who successfully attempt to cross the border between PoEs without being encountered by U.S. Border Patrol (USBP). EWIs include border crossers directly or indirectly observed (but not intercepted) by USBP plus an estimate of the number of undetected border crossers. Undetected EWIs are estimated based on DHS modeling, adapted by Penn Wharton Budget Model.

Estimates of the number of entries without inspection (EWIs) suggest that the absence of legal consequences under Title 42 had a significant impact on migrants’ behavior. Figure 7 plots the estimated number of EWIs in recent years, with the period during which Title 42 authorities were in use highlighted. The number of migrants successfully crossing illegally between ports of entry increased steadily over the Title 42 era, rising from 10 to 15 thousand per month before the surge began to a peak of more than 85,000 per month in 2023. Following the end of Title 42 in May 2023, EWIs immediately dropped 45 percent from May to June and reversed their trend, declining steadily since then.

Figure 8. Repeat Encounter (Recidivism) Rate

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Notes: Repeat encounters are individuals apprehended more than one time by the Border Patrol within a 12-month period.
From 2015 to 2022, the reference period is the fiscal year (the 12-month period ending September). In 2022 and 2023, the reference period is the 12-month period ending August.

The mechanism by which Title 42 produced a sharp increase in EWIs is clear from Figure 8, which shows the repeat encounter (or recidivism) rate. Repeat encounters are apprehensions of migrants who were apprehended more than once within a 12-month period. The repeat encounter rate rose from around 10 percent before the pandemic to more than 25 percent in 2021, when Title 42 was used most extensively. After Title 42 ended, the rate returned to around 10 percent. While Title 42 was in effect, growing numbers of migrants without recourse to the traditional process made repeated attempts to cross the border illegally. It is likely that many of those who eventually succeeded had been previously encountered by CBP and expelled. In the absence of Title 42, most of these migrants would have been apprehended and either deported or released from detention with temporary lawful status. Hence, one lasting consequence of the pandemic – via the policy response – is a rise in the unauthorized immigrant population living in the U.S.



This analysis was produced by Alex Arnon under the direction of the faculty director, Kent Smetters. Mariko Paulson prepared the brief for the website.

  1. Much more detail on immigration policy measures taken in response to the pandemic is available in reports from the Migration Policy Institute and the American Immigration Council.  ↩

  2. Unless otherwise noted, all years in this brief refer to the fiscal year spanning October to September.  ↩

  3. An examination of visa issuance statistics by the Migration Policy Institute finds that the decline in nonimmigrant visa issuance was similar for the visa classes suspended under the proclamation and those that were not.  ↩