Subscribe to be notified of upcoming seminars.
Upcoming and Past PCaMS Seminars.
Location: PWBM’s Philadelphia Office
Date / Time: Thursday November 14, 12:00 PM - 1:30 PM
Eva is an Associate Professor of Economics at Stony Brook University. She is also affiliated with the Stony Brook Center for Game Theory. Her research interests include Macroeconomics, Financial Economics and Computational Economics, with a special interest in public finance and macro finance. Her work has been published in the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Journal of Economic Theory, the International Economic Review, the Review of Economic Dynamics and Theoretical Economics, among other journals. Some of her research studies important tax reforms such as the effect of the Bush and Trump tax cuts. In her latest research she has developed a theory for the design of a Financial Stability Fund for the Eurozone that is now being used by the policy makers at the European Stability Mechanism. She is an editor of the Berkeley Economic Journal of Macroeconomics. At Stony Brook University, she has served as the Director of Graduate Studies and the Director of the MA program in Economics. Before joining Stony Brook, Dr. Carceles-Poveda received her PhD degree in Economics from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. She has been a visiting scholar at the department of economics of the Stern School of Business, UCLA, the University of Rochester, the USC Mashall School of Business and the University of Cambridge, among others. She will present her paper Financing Corporate Tax Cuts with Shareholder Taxes.
Financing Corporate Tax Cuts with Shareholder Taxes
Abstract: We study the aggregate and distributional consequences of replacing corporate profit taxes with shareholder taxes, namely, taxes on dividends and capital gains, in a setting with incomplete markets and heterogeneity at both the household and the firm level. The reform yields distributional gains with a large majority of household benefiting. Moreover, if the dividend and capital gains are taxes at the same rate, the reform is also efficiency-enhancing and the implied optimal corporate income tax rate is zero. In contract, as asymmetric tax treatment of dividend and capital gains induces a trade-off between efficiency and distributional concerns that is optimally resolved at a positive optimal corporate tax rate, implying double taxation.