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Brief, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax: ...

  • Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed a wealth tax equal to 2 percent of net worth above $50 million and 6 percent of net worth above $1 billion, which her campaign estimates would raise $3.75 trillion over 10 years.

  • PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.7 trillion over fiscal years 2021-2030, not including macroeconomic effects. Including macroeconomic effects, PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.3 trillion over the same period.

  • PWBM projects that the proposal would reduce GDP by 0.9 percent in 2050 under the standard budget scoring convention that additional revenues reduce the deficit. If the revenues were instead spent on public investments, PWBM projects GDP in 2050 would fall between 1.0 and 2.1 percent, depending on the productivity of the investment. Average hourly wages in the economy in 2050, including wages earned by households not directly subject to the wealth tax, would fall between 0.8 and 2.3 percent due to the reduction in private capital formation.

Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax: Budgetary and Economic Effects
Blog Post, Tax Policy
Penn Wharton Budget Model
The Revenue-Maximizing Capital Gains Tax Rate: ...

Under current law, PWBM estimates that a 33% capital gains tax rate maximizes revenue, but this rate increases to 42% if stepped-up cost basis at death were eliminated.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: Increase Tax Rates on Capital ...

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of increasing the top rate on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends from 20 percent to 24.2 percent, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise around $60 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.1 percent by 2050.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: A 1% Value-Added Tax

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new broad-based 1 percent value-added tax (VAT) with a progressive universal rebate calculated based on earnings, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise $700 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.8 percent by 2050.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: A Carbon Tax of $30 per ton

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new carbon tax of $30 per ton of emissions, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021, rising by inflation plus 5 percent through 2050. We project that it raises $1.6 trillion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increases GDP by 2.2 percent by 2050.

Background Brief

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Housing Finance: Potential Reforms to Mortgage Markets

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Housing Finance: Potential Reforms to Mortgage Markets
  • The actions taken in the aftermath of the Great Recession allayed the economic burdens of the financial crisis, but the housing market still remains vulnerable to systemic problems that have not been effectively addressed.
  • While access to credit was justifiably tightened following the financial crisis, evidence suggests that new restrictions and standards may be excessively hindering homeownership growth.
  • Since 2008, the secondary mortgage market has seen a significant withdrawal of private capital and a greater involvement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Several proposals have outlined fundamental overhauls to restore the presence of private capital, but policymakers must reform the market to foster competition and accountability without sacrificing stability and liquidity.

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Not Enough Shovels? The Crucial Role of Future Capital Accumulation for U.S. Output Growth

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Not Enough Shovels? The Crucial Role of Future Capital Accumulation for U.S. Output Growth
  • Growth in physical capital per worker has contributed the most to U.S. productivity growth.
  • U.S. capital accumulation is increasingly dependent on foreign capital inflows.
  • If future technology improvement occurs at its average historical rate, maintaining U.S. productivity growth will require more rapid capital accumulation, especially because worker efficiency appears likely to stagnate or decline.

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The Decline in Labor Efficiency in the United States

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The Decline in Labor Efficiency in the United States
  • Workers’ performance on the job is related to all of their demographic and economic attributes, including education, age, family structure, gender, race, labor force status (full- or part-time work), peer group (birth-year), and others.
  • The annual market-wide “effective labor input” depends upon the quantity (number of work hours contributed) and the efficiency (related to worker attributes) of individuals engaged in market production.
  • Labor efficiency is projected to decline in the future and offset growth in labor quantity to slow growth of aggregate “effective labor input.” Official government analysts typically do not project changes in labor efficiency, thereby imparting a more optimistic outlook to budget projections.

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Population Aging

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Population Aging

  • As in many of the world’s developed nations, America is undergoing a momentous increase in the share of older individuals in the population, or “population aging.”

  • Population aging will continue throughout this century because of baby-boomer retirements, longer lifespans due to declining mortality, and fewer newborns from reduced fertility.

  • Sustained population aging will pose a significant fiscal challenge: How best to provide funding for adequately supporting older generations’ consumption and health care.

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Education and Income Growth

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Education and Income Growth
  • The large premium that college degree holders earn relative to workers with only a high school diploma suggests that a better-educated workforce would increase U.S. output.
  • Barriers to borrowing against future income, though, may make it difficult to acquire a college education, implying a potential role for using policy to increase access to college, especially if it is appropriately targeted.
  • However, college education is costly, and the payoff is uncertain and realized only after a lengthy absence from the workforce. Optimal policy, therefore, aims to balance these costs against the potential benefits, requiring the explicit modeling of education attainment when making budget projections.

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Changes in American Economic Productivity

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Changes in American Economic Productivity

  • Improving citizens’ well-being requires increasing productivity over time – the efficiency of converting resources such as labor, land, and physical plant and equipment into useful goods and services.

  • U.S. productivity has slowed dramatically during the last decade, largely due to slower innovation and reduced growth of capital per worker.

  • The productivity slowdown will make funding government programs more challenging. Public policies that encourage additional capital accumulation and reward innovation could reverse at least some of the recent productivity declines.

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Socioeconomic Patterns of Marriage and Divorce

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Socioeconomic Patterns of Marriage and Divorce
  • U.S. divorce rates remain high and the post-1970s marriage decline is continuing.
  • The marriage decline is concentrated among those with fewer years of education.
  • Low earnings and job insecurity induces single-parenthood with negative side effects on children.

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Mortality in the United States: Past, Present, and Future

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Mortality in the United States: Past, Present, and Future
  • The United States experienced an unprecedented decline in mortality during the twentieth century, thanks to improvements in public health, medical advances, and behavioral changes.
  • But mortality and life expectancy improvements have been uneven across age and socioeconomic status.
  • Future changes in mortality will affect the federal budget outlook. However, projections of mortality and life expectancy are highly uncertain. This uncertainty creates additional risk for the nation’s transfer programs to the elderly, which already account for half of government outlays.

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The Effects of Immigration on the United States’ Economy

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The Effects of Immigration on the United States’ Economy

  • While some policymakers have blamed immigration for slowing U.S. wage growth since the 1970s, most academic research finds little long run effect on Americans’ wages.

  • The available evidence suggests that immigration leads to more innovation, a better educated workforce, greater occupational specialization, better matching of skills with jobs, and higher overall economic productivity.

  • Immigration also has a net positive effect on combined federal, state, and local budgets. But not all taxpayers benefit equally. In regions with large populations of less educated, low-income immigrants, native-born residents bear significant net costs due to immigrants’ use of public services, especially education.

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Emergent Changes in American Demography and Social Organization

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Emergent Changes in American Demography and Social Organization
  • The American Family is changing in response to the pressures and opportunities facing young individuals.
  • Many children today are being raised by single parents, which is associated with a lower transmission of skills to succeeding generations.
  • Technological advances and public provision of social protection benefits appear to be contributing to the decline of the nuclear family.

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The Economic Determinants of Fertility Choices

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The Economic Determinants of Fertility Choices
  • The demographic transition toward an older population is ongoing in America and Europe. The transition began earlier in Europe where fertility rates have declined much more. Will America follow in Europe’s footsteps?
  • Procreation and family formation appears influenced by the social and economic conditions facing young adults. Younger American women appear to be postponing childbirth. Will this reduce future American TFR to still lower levels?
  • Government policies influence the economic environment and affect fertility choices indirectly. Social Security and various retiree health programs have likely reduced fertility, making their own financing more difficult.

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Fertility in the United States: Hanging On?

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Fertility in the United States: Hanging On?
  • The baby bust of the 1960s saw the U.S. total fertility rate (TFR) dip to just below the 2.1 live births per woman needed to prevent population decline.
  • U.S. TFR fell again after the Great Recession of 2008-09, which eroded women’s and couples’ economic ability to bear and raise children.
  • Large and persistent declines in European fertility to well below the 2.1 threshold is a worrisome precursor: America’s budget problem of funding elder-care would worsen if the U.S. TFR meets with the same fate as that of Europe.

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