Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed a wealth tax equal to 2 percent of net worth above $50 million and 6 percent of net worth above $1 billion, which her campaign estimates would raise $3.75 trillion over 10 years.
PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.7 trillion over fiscal years 2021-2030, not including macroeconomic effects. Including macroeconomic effects, PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.3 trillion over the same period.
PWBM projects that the proposal would reduce GDP by 0.9 percent in 2050 under the standard budget scoring convention that additional revenues reduce the deficit. If the revenues were instead spent on public investments, PWBM projects GDP in 2050 would fall between 1.0 and 2.1 percent, depending on the productivity of the investment. Average hourly wages in the economy in 2050, including wages earned by households not directly subject to the wealth tax, would fall between 0.8 and 2.3 percent due to the reduction in private capital formation.
We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of increasing the top rate on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends from 20 percent to 24.2 percent, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise around $60 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.1 percent by 2050.
We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new broad-based 1 percent value-added tax (VAT) with a progressive universal rebate calculated based on earnings, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise $700 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.8 percent by 2050.
We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new carbon tax of $30 per ton of emissions, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021, rising by inflation plus 5 percent through 2050. We project that it raises $1.6 trillion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increases GDP by 2.2 percent by 2050.
The COVID-19 spike in mortality is the pandemic’s most direct demographic consequence, but not the only one. Factoring in changes in fertility, disruptions to immigration, and indirect demographic spillovers, we estimate that the pandemic reduced the U.S. population 0.5 percent over the long term.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a decline in births in 2020 followed by a rebound in 2021. We present new estimates of “excess” births during the pandemic, which show that on net over the two-year period, births were roughly in line with pre-pandemic trends.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused major disruptions to U.S. immigration. Policymakers imposed travel restrictions, stopped visa processing, and made significant changes at the border. The pandemic and policy response led to more employment-based immigration and increased illegal border crossings instead of reducing them.
We explain how the PWBM uses its dynamic Overlapping Generation (OLG) model to analyze tax policies affecting foreign-earned income by affiliates of U.S.-domiciled firms. We evaluate two illustrative policy changes: we show how firms’ tax liabilities and the allocation of capital between domestic and international production are affected by an increase in foreign tax rates and a decrease in U.S. tax exemptions on foreign-derived income.
After Ireland ended the Double Irish tax planning strategy in 2020, US firms with historical links to Ireland have shifted their intellectual property (IP) away from traditional tax havens to Ireland and the US to take advantage of tax incentives offered by both countries. This has coincided with a significant increase in Irish corporate tax revenue, particularly for less capital-intensive firms. Repatriation of foreign earnings to the United States has also increased, but fiscal benefits to the US have been offset by tax incentives passed under TCJA.
Improvements in U.S. life expectancy stalled in the 2010s, years before the COVID-19 pandemic produced a spike in mortality. We present new estimates of historical patterns in mortality by socio-demographic group and projections of U.S. mortality through 2060.
We examine two major investment tax incentives for the computer sector. The impact on computer-sector investment as well as economy-wide investment is very small, even when the computer sector is modeled as a production complement.
The impact of income-driven repayment (IDR) educational financing plans by income, race, and gender is not generally well understood. Our analysis estimates that approximately 43 percent of the subsidies from President Biden’s Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan will accrue to current Black student borrowers and 71 percent to current female borrowers. While lower- to middle-income student borrowers stand to gain the most, we estimate that about a fifth of the benefits will go to households in the top 20 percent of the income distribution, and borrowers with graduate-level education who benefit from the SAVE plan tend to experience the highest savings on average.
We estimate that the Harris Campaign tax and spending proposals would increase primary deficits by $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years on a conventional basis and by $2.0 trillion on a dynamic basis that includes a reduction in economic activity. Lower and middle-income households generally benefit from increased transfers and credits on a conventional basis, while higher-income households are worse off.
We estimate that the Trump Campaign tax and spending proposals would increase primary deficits by $5.8 trillion over the next 10 years on a conventional basis and by $4.1 trillion on a dynamic basis that includes economic feedback effects. Households across all income groups benefit on a conventional basis.
We analyze a new illustrative policy to create automatic retirement savings accounts for more than 56 million low-income Americans by 2030. The program is fully financed by removing the gross income adjustment for traditional 401k and similar retirement accounts without any additional contribution from households or employers. The program relies on the existing EITC administration without employer participation. After accounting for risk, individual account balances reach over $200,000 by retirement and any balances can be bequeathed upon death.
Several provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) are scheduled to expire (“sunset”) by the end of 2025. We estimate that permanently extending the TCJA would increase primary deficits by $4.0 trillion over the next decade on a conventional basis and by $3.83 trillion including economic feedback effects. By 2054, debt would increase by 16 percent. The policy would modestly increase GDP (by 0.2 percent) relative to current law.
PWBM estimates that President Biden’s FY2025 budget proposal would reduce primary deficits by $1.7 trillion over the 2025-2034 budget window. Accounting for economic feedback effects, GDP falls by 0.8 percent relative to current law in 2034. By 2054, debt falls by 5.4 percent and GDP declines by 1.3 percent relative to current law.
We analyze the budgetary and economic effects of three very different illustrative policy bundles that reduce federal budget deficits over time without shrinking the economy relative to current law with rising debt. The results also demonstrate how federal debt falls short of measuring the true fiscal burden being shifted to future generations.
We examine recent trends in the activities of US multinationals and their foreign affiliates using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s annual survey of US direct investment abroad. Since the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), multinational activity has become more domestically concentrated, continuing a trend that started before the legislation. This has coincided with a decline in the US effective corporate tax rate and relatively stable foreign effective tax rates.
We estimate that President Biden’s recently announced “New Plans” to provide relief to student borrowers will cost $84 billion, in addition to the $475 billion that we previously estimated for President Biden’s SAVE plan. Moreover, some debt relief in the New Plans accrues to borrowers in households with income more than the SAVE plan coverage.
U.S. population growth is projected to decline, and the population will become much older over time. Preventing these outcomes will require faster immigration by several multiples of its current rate.
The House of Representative is considering legislation that would retroactively double the cap on deductions for state and local taxes (SALT) for married filers for just 2023, which PWBM previously estimated would cost $12 billion. This brief examines the cost of cap increases if enacted for tax years 2024 and beyond. Depending on the policy design—including size of the cap, AGI limit, and filing status requirements—the additional cost varies from $22 billion to $197 billion over 10 years. However, if other expiring provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 were also extended permanently, the SALT-related costs alone increase to between $107 billion to $1,116 billion, depending on policy design.
PWBM estimates that the Wyden-Smith tax proposal (H.R. 7024) would reduce revenues by $3 billion over the next decade on a conventional basis.
We report estimates from the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) that exempting employment-based green cards from statutory limits for applicants (and their families) who have earned a doctoral or master’s degree in a STEM field---similar to Section 80303 in H.R. 4521---would reduce federal budget deficits by $129 billion from 2025 to 2034. In contrast, a conventional budget estimate, which would include projected increases in federal spending but not the effect of a larger population on federal tax revenues, shows an increase in federal deficits of $4 billion.
