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Brief, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax: ...

  • Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed a wealth tax equal to 2 percent of net worth above $50 million and 6 percent of net worth above $1 billion, which her campaign estimates would raise $3.75 trillion over 10 years.

  • PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.7 trillion over fiscal years 2021-2030, not including macroeconomic effects. Including macroeconomic effects, PWBM estimates that the proposal would raise about $2.3 trillion over the same period.

  • PWBM projects that the proposal would reduce GDP by 0.9 percent in 2050 under the standard budget scoring convention that additional revenues reduce the deficit. If the revenues were instead spent on public investments, PWBM projects GDP in 2050 would fall between 1.0 and 2.1 percent, depending on the productivity of the investment. Average hourly wages in the economy in 2050, including wages earned by households not directly subject to the wealth tax, would fall between 0.8 and 2.3 percent due to the reduction in private capital formation.

Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax: Budgetary and Economic Effects
Blog Post, Tax Policy
Penn Wharton Budget Model
The Revenue-Maximizing Capital Gains Tax Rate: ...

Under current law, PWBM estimates that a 33% capital gains tax rate maximizes revenue, but this rate increases to 42% if stepped-up cost basis at death were eliminated.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: Increase Tax Rates on Capital ...

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of increasing the top rate on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends from 20 percent to 24.2 percent, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise around $60 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.1 percent by 2050.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: A 1% Value-Added Tax

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new broad-based 1 percent value-added tax (VAT) with a progressive universal rebate calculated based on earnings, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021. We project that it will raise $700 billion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increase GDP by 0.8 percent by 2050.

Blog Post, Tax Policy, Economic Growth
Penn Wharton Budget Model
Policy Options: A Carbon Tax of $30 per ton

We estimate the budgetary and economic effects of a new carbon tax of $30 per ton of emissions, which is enacted on January 1st, 2021, rising by inflation plus 5 percent through 2050. We project that it raises $1.6 trillion of additional revenue on a conventional basis over the 10-year budget window and increases GDP by 2.2 percent by 2050.

Other Public Policy

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When Debt Rises, the Treasury Rebalances to Long-Term Securities

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To finance government spending above tax revenues, the federal government issues debt. According to USAFacts, in 2015 the federal government paid more than $220 billion in interest on this debt. Moreover, interest on the federal debt is growing larger, and it is becoming an increasingly important part of PWBM’s long-term budget projections. To make more accurate projections of interest paid on the federal debt, PWBM will begin projecting the maturity structure of federal debt.

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Can Governments Use Blockchain?

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Kevin Werbach, professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at Wharton and founder of Supernova Group, spoke at Penn Wharton Budget Model’s Spring Policy Forum. He discussed the uses and risks of blockchain, a technology he argues is the “most overhyped technology of our time” as well as “the most significant fundamental advance in digital platform since the Internet.”

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Data-Based Policy Analysis

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PWBM is built in consultation with extensive data sources. A comprehensive list of our data store can be found here.

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Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction

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Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
  • The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) plans to shift airwaves from TV broadcast to wireless use to respond to shifts in airwave demand.
  • In 2016, the FCC held a two-phase auction. In the first phase, TV broadcasters determined the lowest acceptable selling price. In the second phase, wireless data companies determined the highest acceptable purchase price. Taxpayers kept the difference which can be used to cover the cost of license reassignment.
  • However, simulations show that the FCC’s auction rules don’t maximize taxpayer value. When one company owns multiple TV broadcast licenses, it’s possible for that company to increase the selling price by limiting the supply of licenses available on the auction. Therefore, companies with multiple licenses can shift wealth from taxpayers to themselves.

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