Effective Tariff Rates and Revenues (Updated September 10, 2025)
The USITC recently released updated trade and tariff data . We use this data to provide up-to-date estimates of customs revenue and effective tariff rates through July 2025.
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Effective Tariff Rates and Revenues (Updated through June 2025)
The USITC recently released updated trade and tariff data . We use this data to provide up-to-date estimates of customs revenue and effective tariff rates through June 2025.
Import Surges and Tariff Avoidance: The Short-Term Impact of the Trump Administrationâs Trade Policies
We estimate that importers avoided 13.1 percent ($6.5 billion) of new tariffs by accelerating purchases and changing their purchasing patterns in response to the new tariff regime. Importers especially stockpiled pharmaceuticals and precious metals during 2025 Q1.
Debt, Tariffs, and Capital Markets in a Dynamic Setting: An Explainer
We examine recent capital market dynamics in the context of budget reconciliation and trade policies. Understanding these dynamics requires modeling the interaction between microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic outcomesâan approach particularly well suited for the overlapping-generations lifecycle model.
Tax Collections Remain Strong in 2025 Despite IRS Concerns
Treasury data through April 28 shows that tax receipts are broadly in line with government projections made earlier this year, before the downsizing of the IRS was announced. Receipts from tariffs have significantly exceeded projections.
The Economic Effects of President Trumpâs Tariffs
Many trade models fail to capture the full harm of tariffs. PWBM projects Trumpâs tariffs (April 8, 2025) will reduce long-run GDP by about 6% and wages by 5%. A middle-income household faces a $22K lifetime loss. These losses are twice as large as a revenue-equivalent corporate tax increase from 21% to 36%, an otherwise highly distorting tax.
Update on the Revenue Effects of GILTI and FDII, 2026 Rate Changes, and Proposed Policy Reforms
We analyze new data from the US Treasury to examine historical revenue effects of TCJAâs international corporate tax provisions. We also provide updated conventional estimates to assess the revenue impact of scheduled 2026 rate increases on foreign income of US corporations and assess several proposals that aim to further increase tax revenue.
Taxing Foreign Affiliates of U.S.-Domiciled Firms
We explain how the PWBM uses its dynamic Overlapping Generation (OLG) model to analyze tax policies affecting foreign-earned income by affiliates of U.S.-domiciled firms. We evaluate two illustrative policy changes: we show how firmsâ tax liabilities and the allocation of capital between domestic and international production are affected by an increase in foreign tax rates and a decrease in U.S. tax exemptions on foreign-derived income.
Projections of Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income: A Validation Exercise
Under current law, PWBM projects that U.S. multinationals will report a cumulative $3.6 trillion in Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) between 2022 and 2031. Data released in July 2021 by the Internal Revenue Service for the 2018 tax year provides the first opportunity for a more extensive validation of PWBMâs model of U.S. multinationalsâ tax returns. PWBM projects 2018 GILTI within 5.3 percent of the IRS value, suggesting a very good model fit.
School Reopening During COVID-19: A Cost-Benefit Analysis for Philadelphia Suburbs
We estimate the average cost of a COVID-19 infection for four Philadelphia-area counties at $8,000 to $13,000, less than half of our national average cost estimate ($27,230). We estimate a trade-off between cost of infections to the community from in-person schooling versus the lost future earnings to students from closing schools. For example, if Montgomery county had implemented full in-person school in the fall, we project the costs of infection would have been at most $429 million. However, closing schools costs students as much as $4.4 billion in present value of future wages.
COVID: Trade-offs in School Reopening
We estimate that each month of school closures in response to the COVID pandemic cost current students between $12,000 and $15,000 in future earnings due to lower educational quality. We also estimate total value-of-life, medical, and productivity costs per infection at $38,315 for September 2020. Using these costs, we calculate the cost-benefit threshold to keeping schools closed for October at over 0.355 new expected infections in the community per student kept out of school.
Decline of Globalism: Capital Flows Update
Using more recent data on international capital flows, we find that the âeffective opennessâ of the U.S. economy has decreased to 31.5 percent openness for private capital flows and 33.3 percent U.S. debt take-up by foreigners. This decline is in line with our prediction from last yearâs posts on the effect of tariffs.
The Effect of the U.S. - China Trade War on the U.S. Economy
PWBMâs Efraim Berkovich, the Wharton Schoolâs Marshall Meyer and Mary Lovely of the Maxwell School of Syracuse University discussed how the recently imposed tariffs on Chinese goods are raising prices for consumers, disrupting supply chains and weighing down economic growth in the long-run.
Are Tariffs a Drag? Trade War Pushes Interest Rates Up, Economy Down
We find that, excluding times of intervention by the Federal Reserve, interest rates on U.S. government debt are higher when levels of effective openness to foreign capital flows are lower, increasing the governmentâs borrowing costs.
The Trade War Trade-Off: Foreigner Ownership of American Business Actually Rises
We project that, although a trade war initially lowers the share of U.S. capital owned by foreigners, the trade war will actually increase the amount of American business capital owned by foreigners, by almost $1 trillion by 2028. Over time, the foreign owned share of business capital rises from about 29 percent today to over 34 percent in 2049.
The Trade War Trade-Off: Short Term Gains Then Long Term Losses
We project that even if the recently imposed tariffs are removed, GDP will be permanently smaller relative to having had no trade war. Extending the current trade war by several more years will lead to smaller losses in GDP in 2020 but will reduce GDP by more in the long run.
