Key Points
The pandemic led to at least 1.4 million additional deaths. It also produced a decline in the number of births in 2020 with an offsetting rise in births in 2021 and sharp fall in the number of noncitizens coming to live the U.S from abroad.
Changes to the population such as deaths, births, and immigration or emigration have spillover effects on others in the population through changes to family structure, marriage, fertility, and migration. These spillovers are not captured in estimates of the pandemic’s immediate impact but are reflected in our estimates.
We estimate that about two thirds of the 0.5 percent long-term reduction in population is attributable to increased mortality. The other one third is attributable to the fall in immigration during the pandemic years.
The Long-Run Impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. Population
The COVID-19 pandemic produced a dramatic rise in mortality, leading to 1.4 million additional deaths in 2020, 2021, and 2022. These deaths are the pandemic’s most immediate demographic consequence, but not the only one. The number of births declined sharply in 2020 and then rebounded in 2021, interrupting the long-term decline in birth rates. The pandemic also disrupted nearly every aspect of the U.S. immigration system, with lasting effects on the foreign-born population.
More broadly, the immediate effects of COVID-19 do not fully capture its long term consequences for the U.S. population. The deaths that would have been avoided in a world without COVID-19 have demographic implications beyond the decedents themselves, affecting anyone they have or would have interacted with. A single death may have many secondary effects reflected in changes in family structure, marriage, fertility, and migration. The same is true of immigrants who could not come as a result of the pandemic; immigrants who stayed when they would otherwise have emigrated; the births that didn’t occur; the births that did; and many others. Each individual change in the population has ripple effects that may manifest over decades.
In this brief, we present estimates of COVID-19’s long-run population impact that reflect this comprehensive view of the pandemic’s effects. Using PWBM’s detailed microsimulation model, we simulate how the population would have evolved if the pandemic had not occurred. To generate this counterfactual, we estimate the pandemic’s first order effects on mortality, fertility, and immigration. With these estimates, we use the microsimulation to produce a comprehensive estimate that accounts for interactions across the population.
To measure the full impact of COVID-19 on mortality, we estimate “excess” deaths associated with the pandemic. Excess all-cause mortality is a more complete measure of the pandemic’s effects than reported deaths attributed to COVID-19. It describes the deviation of actual all-cause mortality from expected all-cause mortality, which is based on recent trends. Excess mortality captures COVID-19 deaths that were misattributed to a different cause of death (due to a lack of testing or inconsistent reporting practices) as well as deaths from other causes that are indirectly attributable to the pandemic.
As we discuss in more detail in a companion brief, we estimate monthly excess deaths by detailed socio-demographic group. We deem an observed count of monthly deaths to be in “excess” if the number of observed deaths is statistically different (in either direction) from expected deaths under pre-pandemic trends. Otherwise, we use the observed value as the expected number of deaths. We then define the difference between observed and expected deaths to be the number excess deaths.
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates from National Vital Statistics System and Census Bureau data.
Figure 1 plots our estimates of total monthly excess all-cause deaths from March 2020 through December 2022. Over the full period, we estimate nearly 1.4 million excess deaths occurred. Around 1.2 million of these deaths occurred in the first two years of the pandemic, with the first year (March 2020-February 2021) containing the greatest number of excess deaths.
To estimate the pandemic’s impact on births, we adopt the same approach as for mortality, described above and in a companion brief. We estimate monthly excess births, defined as statistically significant differences from expected births given recent fertility patterns.
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates from National Vital Statistics System and Census Bureau data.
Figure 2 shows cumulative monthly excess births during this period. Births began to drop consistently below expectations in August of 2020 and then plummeted in late 2020 to early 2021, bottoming out with 21,000 fewer births than expected in February 2021. However, from April 2021 onwards, the number of births leapt back up and maintained or outpaced expectations for most of the year.
In total, negative excess births in 2020 and early 2021 reduced the number of births by 70,000 through February 2021, relative to expectations. The boom of positive excess births in 2021 reversed this decline, however, and by the end of 2021 had largely offset the previous year’s shortfall.
COVID-19 virtually shut down much of the U.S. immigration system in 2020 and 2021, and significant components of the immigration policy response to the pandemic remained in effect through 2023. As we discuss in a companion brief, the pandemic led to sharp fall in the number of noncitizens admitted to live in the U.S. on a permanent or temporary basis.
Figure 3 plots the number of resident nonimmigrants admitted to the U.S. year, which includes nonimmigrants who reside in the U.S. temporarily for purposes like employment or education and excludes non-resident visitors such as tourists. The number of nonimmigrants entering the U.S. declined more than 50 percent from 2019 to 2021, falling below 2 million.
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates based on data from the Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Notes: The number of nonimmigrant individuals admitted each year is estimated based on annual nonimmigrant admissions and the number of times each nonimmigrant is admitted per year.
Resident nonimmigrants are temporary workers, students, exchange visitors, diplomats and other representatives, and their families. It does not include temporary visitors for business or pleasure or other classes of nonimmigrants who do not remain the U.S. long enough to be considered residents.
Years are fiscal years.
Resident nonimmigrants are authorized to live in the U.S. temporarily and most return to their home country within a few years of their arrival. However, a temporary nonimmigrant visa is often a first step toward permanent immigration, and many nonimmigrants transition to a different temporary status to remain in the U.S. after their initial visa is no longer valid (for example, an international student on an F1 visa transitioning to an H-1B visa).
The number of resident nonimmigrants entering the U.S. has rebounded since 2021 and in 2023 rose to nearly 4.2 million, more than 10 percent higher than the pre-pandemic peak of around 3.75 million in 2019. This rebound likely reflects some degree of pent-up arrivals from the pandemic years, but it is highly unlikely that the 2020-2022 shortfall of roughly 4 million nonimmigrants arrivals will ever be made up.
Some features of the U.S. immigration system helped mitigate the impact of disruptions to travel and to the government’s operations abroad. Figure 2 shows that the number of new lawful permanent residents (LPRs) arriving from abroad with family-sponsored green cards fell sharply in 2020 and 2021, as one of the most common paths to permanent immigration from outside the U.S. was closed off.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics.
Note: The dashed line shows the linear trend from 2014 to 2019, extrapolated through 2023.
Years are fiscal years.
When the number of family-based green cards issued in a year is less than annual statutory limit, they are added to the limit on employment-based visas the following year in a process referred to as rollover. Figure 2 plots pre-pandemic trends as simple proxy for typical green card issuance, given statutory numerical limits. The decline in family-sponsored new arrivals in 2021 left about 141,000 green cards unused in that year. In 2022, employment-based new arrivals rose by 16,000 and adjustment of status rose by 125,000, totaling 141,000 additional employment-based LPRs. New employment-sponsored LPRs remained elevated in 2023, reflecting the continuing shortfall in family-based arrivals in 2022. Hence, one consequence of the pandemic was a temporary shift in the balance of permanent immigration away from family preferences and toward employment preferences.
See the companion brief for a discussion of immigration outside of lawful processes during the pandemic.
To estimate the pandemic’s long run population impact, we simulate the U.S. population beginning in 2020 under three counterfactual assumptions: 1) the excess mortality related to COVID-19 does not occur; 2) the excess births related to COVID-19 do not occur; 3) the disruptions and policy changes to the immigration system related to COVID-19 do not occur. We then compare that scenario with historical estimates and projections of the actual U.S. population.
Figure 3 plots the estimated percentage difference in the size of the U.S. population over time, broken down into contributions from mortality and immigration. Because the number of excess births was small (around 30,000 in 2020 and 2021) and positive and negative excess births largely offset each other over the period, their effect is too small to distinguish from normal random variation in the population from year to year, so no contribution is shown.
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model
We estimate that the percentage reduction in the population due to COVID-19 grew from 0.13 percent in 2020 to a peak of -0.64 percent in 2023 as the pandemic persisted the effects of previous years’ losses began compounding. Over the following decade, it shrunk to less than half that, largely because the pandemic accelerated the deaths of many people who would otherwise have died in those years. We estimate a long-run effect of just over 0.5 percent on the U.S. population, about two thirds about which reflects the impact of COVID-19-related mortality (past and ongoing) and one third of which reflects the absence of immigrants who would have settled in the U.S. and their descendants.
This analysis was produced by Alex Arnon under the direction of the faculty director, Kent Smetters. Mariko Paulson prepared the brief for the website.
Date Cumulative Excess Deaths 2020-03-01 13566.39572 2020-04-01 90746.37591 2020-05-01 132858.9617 2020-06-01 147941.0442 2020-07-01 197240.8737 2020-08-01 245129.9944 2020-09-01 268980.2688 2020-10-01 302923.3746 2020-11-01 356978.5405 2020-12-01 468633.4077 2021-01-01 586915.7993 2021-02-01 612132.0868 2021-03-01 630743.6258 2021-04-01 644531.1322 2021-05-01 663595.6165 2021-06-01 675866.7922 2021-07-01 703184.0471 2021-08-01 778126.0478 2021-09-01 858692.421 2021-10-01 920081.7625 2021-11-01 960489.6854 2021-12-01 1024368.825 2022-01-01 1138911.464 2022-02-01 1173464.103 2022-03-01 1188169.798 2022-04-01 1192282.361 2022-05-01 1209110.408 2022-06-01 1225618.873 2022-07-01 1256110.079 2022-08-01 1285326.218 2022-09-01 1303231.336 2022-10-01 1328713.711 2022-11-01 1348060.756 2022-12-01 1392409.543
Date Cumulative Excess Births 2020-01-01 00:00:00 2372.700276 2020-02-01 00:00:00 -1621.82946 2020-03-01 00:00:00 846.2814855 2020-04-01 00:00:00 94.23319129 2020-05-01 00:00:00 -588.7256811 2020-06-01 00:00:00 -4778.806257 2020-07-01 00:00:00 -4007.201693 2020-08-01 00:00:00 -5040.402141 2020-09-01 00:00:00 -10275.38516 2020-10-01 00:00:00 -12895.38465 2020-11-01 00:00:00 -31164.02571 2020-12-01 00:00:00 -36287.28608 2021-01-01 00:00:00 -50997.46808 2021-02-01 00:00:00 -72307.31518 2021-03-01 00:00:00 -60321.03994 2021-04-01 00:00:00 -60337.68151 2021-05-01 00:00:00 -58837.49175 2021-06-01 00:00:00 -55166.49434 2021-07-01 00:00:00 -46896.08909 2021-08-01 00:00:00 -39739.86234 2021-09-01 00:00:00 -31602.00254 2021-10-01 00:00:00 -25379.93599 2021-11-01 00:00:00 -21514.42336 2021-12-01 00:00:00 -2339.646014
Year Resident Nonimmigrant Individuals Admitted 2014 3301868 2015 3574129 2016 3696099 2017 3694224 2018 3690128 2019 3765605 2020 2558810 2021 1804679 2022 2924421 2023 4187167
ClassOfAdmission TypeOfAdmission Year Value Trend Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2014 21951 21210.85714 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2015 22069 22685.91429 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2016 24253 24160.97143 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2017 24525 25636.02857 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2018 27824 27111.08571 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2019 28769 28586.14286 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2020 15218 30061.2 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2021 16282 31536.25714 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2022 48911 33011.31429 Employment-based preferences New arrivals 2023 49550 34486.37143 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2014 129645 125889.3333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2015 121978 122175.5333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2016 113640 118461.7333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2017 113330 114747.9333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2018 110347 111034.1333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2019 110689 107320.3333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2020 133741 103606.5333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2021 177056 99892.73333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2022 221373 96178.93333 Employment-based preferences Adjustments of status 2023 146870 92465.13333 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2014 205902 211887.5238 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2015 197127 209400.181 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2016 222971 206912.8381 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2017 218760 204425.4952 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2018 204115 201938.1524 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2019 185140 199450.8095 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2020 107602 196963.4667 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2021 44188 194476.1238 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2022 153615 191988.781 Family-sponsored preferences New arrivals 2023 191410 189501.4381 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2014 23202 19218 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2015 16783 18199.2 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2016 15116 17180.4 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2017 13478 16161.6 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2018 12448 15142.8 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2019 18999 14124 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2020 13958 13105.2 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2021 21502 12086.4 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2022 12426 11067.6 Family-sponsored preferences Adjustments of status 2023 11130 10048.8
Year Mortality Immigration 2020 -0.04650813 -0.0846005 2021 -0.21521437 -0.15246193 2022 -0.31328901 -0.25160059 2023 -0.41844127 -0.23051592 2024 -0.39375585 -0.19665941 2025 -0.37631944 -0.17194183 2026 -0.35317554 -0.16110673 2027 -0.33225444 -0.17383248 2028 -0.30120304 -0.19167338 2029 -0.27291749 -0.18788313 2030 -0.24043043 -0.17008627 2031 -0.22375202 -0.13317758 2032 -0.21894313 -0.09904498 2033 -0.21521283 -0.09901132 2034 -0.20942264 -0.10859282 2035 -0.21726501 -0.13204597 2036 -0.2229925 -0.13979265 2037 -0.23107232 -0.14871907 2038 -0.23864045 -0.15607495 2039 -0.24776116 -0.16374874 2040 -0.26035657 -0.17368991 2041 -0.27334936 -0.18323971 2042 -0.28366224 -0.18973939 2043 -0.29259337 -0.19204955 2044 -0.30197552 -0.19230282 2045 -0.30953332 -0.19274854 2046 -0.31457372 -0.19294494 2047 -0.31822927 -0.19170834 2048 -0.32096303 -0.19017524 2049 -0.32323802 -0.18948216 2050 -0.32421001 -0.1896666 2051 -0.32353294 -0.18996589 2052 -0.32241713 -0.19031634 2053 -0.3220729 -0.19065425 2054 -0.32243656 -0.19097815 2055 -0.32269511 -0.19132108 2056 -0.32293486 -0.19167104 2057 -0.32324217 -0.19201607 2058 -0.32361804 -0.1923382 2059 -0.32399492 -0.19265631 2060 -0.32435624 -0.19301361